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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's appellate decision that reversed
the magistrate court's order denying Corey Thiel's motion for immediate release
from custody.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In December 2011, the state charged Thiel with felony domestic battery.
(Idaho Data Repository, Ada County Case No. CR-2011-20485.) Pursuant to an
agreement with the state, Thiel ultimately pied guilty to an amended charge of
misdemeanor domestic battery and was placed on supervised probation. (Id.)
Approximately one week later, the state charged Thiel with misdemeanor
violation of a no-contact order for an incident which occurred while the domestic
battery charge was pending. (R., pp.7-8.) Thiel pied guilty to violating the nocontact order, and the magistrate court imposed credit for time served,
suspended jail time, and two years unsupervised probation.

(R., pp.22-25.)

Under the terms of probation, Thiel was required to comply with the terms of
supervised probation in his domestic battery case. (Id.)
Approximately two months later, the state filed a motion for probation
violation in Theil's no-contact order violation case. (R., pp.31-32.) Thiel admitted
violating his probation by missing meetings with his probation officer, failing to
appear for drug testing, and providing a diluted drug test. (See R., p.74.) The
district court reinstated Thiel on probation. (R., pp.38-39). Approximately four
months after that, the state filed a second motion for probation violation, alleging

1

Thiel failed to maintain contact with his probation officer and failed to provide
documentation that he completed required domestic violence treatment.
pp.44-45.)

(R.,

Thiel admitted the violation, and the district court revoked Thiel's

probation and imposed his original sentence, which included 289 days remaining
to serve. (R., p.53.)
In October 2013, the Ada County Sheriff wrote the magistrate court and
recommended that Thiel be granted an early release from jail. 1 (R., p.93.) The
Sheriff cited I.C. § 20-621 and stated that "[w]hile an inmate in the Ada County
Jail, [Thiel] had a good record and performed all assigned tasks in an orderly and
peaceable manner." (Id.) Thiel also separately moved for "immediate release,"
citing the Sheriff's letter. (R., pp.80-82.) The magistrate court denied both the
Sheriff's request and Thiel's motion.

(R., p.83. 93.)

Upon Thiel's proposed

release order, the magistrate court wrote, "I will not sign an order releasing an
untreated, violent offender into the community.

The Ada County Sheriff, if he

believes he has the authority to do so, may release regardless of my ... concerns
for safety." (R., p.83.)

Thiel appealed the magistrate court's order denying his

motion for release from jail to the district court. (R., pp.84-86.)
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court held that the
magistrate court erred in denying Thiel's motion for release from custody. (R.,
pp.119-126.) Specifically, the district court concluded that where a county sheriff

1 At

the time the Sheriff sent this letter, it appears Thiel had already completed
the sentence in his domestic battery case, but still had time to serve on his
sentence in the no-contact order violation case. (See R., p.53; Idaho Data
Repository, Ada County Case No. CR-2011-20485.)
2

recommends an inmate release pursuant to I.C. § 20-621, the magistrate court is
required to release the inmate. (Id.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp.127-130.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in reversing the magistrate court's order denying
Thiel's motion for release from jail?

4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Reversing The Magistrate Court's Order Denying
Thiel's Motion For Release From Jail
A.

Introduction
In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court held that where a

county sheriff recommends an inmate's release pursuant to I.C. § 20-621, the
magistrate court's acceptance of the recommendation is mandatory. (R., pp.119126.) The district court erred because I.C. § 20-621 is ambiguous as to the
respective roles and duties of the county sheriff and magistrate court in the goodtime early inmate release process, and an application of the rules of statutory
construction reveals that the legislature did not intend to give county sheriffs
unbridled authority to release inmates.

The district court therefore erred in

reversing the magistrate court's order denying Theil's motion for immediate
release.
In the alternative, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 does provide county sheriffs
the authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute violates
the Idaho Constitution because it deprives the judicial branch of its power to
sentence offenders.

B.

Standard Of Review
The

meaning

and

effect

of

a

statute,

including

the

statute's

constitutionality, is a question of law over which the appellate courts exercise free
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). "The party
attacking a statute on

constitutional grounds must overcome a strong

5

presumption of validity." State v. Laramore, 145 Idaho 428, 430, 179 P.3d 1084,
1086 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126,
131 (2003)). "Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute
that upholds its constitutionality."

19.:.

On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008)
(citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The appellate
court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial
and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether
the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."

19.:.

"If those

findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district
court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district
court's decision as a matter of procedure."

19.:.

(citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670,

183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).

C.

Idaho Code § 20-621 Does Not Require A Magistrate Court To Grant A
County Sheriff's Inmate Release Request
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted

according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will
not resort to principles of statutory construction.

State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho

360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy. 128 Idaho 362,365, 913 P.2d
578, 581 (1996).

"When a statute is unambiguous, it must be interpreted in

accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, and a reviewing
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court may not apply rules of construction." State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189,
191, 824 P.2d 120, 122 (1992) (citations omitted).
When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what the
legislature intended it to mean. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730,
732 (2009). To determine that intent, the appellate court examines not only the
literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of the proposed
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history.

!!!:.

In determining the ordinary meaning of a statute "effect must give given to all the
words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant." State v. Mercer, 143 Idaho 108, 109, 138 P.3d 308, 309 (2006).
Idaho Code§ 20-621 reads:
Every person serving a jail sentence in a county jail in the
state of Idaho who has a good record as a prisoner and who
performs the tasks assigned him in an orderly and peaceable
manner, shall upon the recommendation of the sheriff be allowed
five (5) days off of each and every month of his sentence, by the
magistrate judge.
Idaho Code§ 20-621 is ambiguous as to the respective roles and duties of
the county sheriff and magistrate court in the good-time early inmate release
process.

While the statute identifies the sheriff and magistrate judge as

participants in this process, and sets forth criteria for an inmate's early release,
the statute does not identify the scope or existence of judicial review, nor does it
expressly provide that such judicial review is precluded.

However, a closer

review of the language utilized in the statute, and a consideration of relevant
public policy concerns, reveals that the legislature did not intend to grant county

7

sheriffs the authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates based upon
their own unreviewable finding of compliance with the statutory criteria.
First, the statute tellingly sets the good-time early inmate release process
in motion "upon the recommendation" of a county sheriff.

(Emphasis added.)

The term "recommendation" indicates a suggestion which may or may not be
followed, rather than a mandatory directive. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition,
(1990), defines "recommendation" as an "action which is advisory in nature
rather than one having any binding effect."

Thus, while I.C. § 20-621 provides

county sheriffs the authority to recommend early inmate release under some
circumstances, such an action does not bind the magistrate court.
Further, rather than expressly and directly requiring the magistrate court to
follow such a "recommendation" of a county sheriff, the statute merely provides
that an inmate receiving such a recommendation "[s]hall ... be allowed" early
release "by the magistrate judge." I.C. § 20-621 (emphasis added). Again, the
phrase "be allowed" indicates permission or eligibility for release subject to
judicial review, not a mandatory directive. If the legislature intended to provide a
county sheriff the authority to direct the magistrate court to release inmates, it
would have utilized the term "shall" in terms of the release itself, i.e., "shall
release," or "shall follow the recommendation for release." Instead, pursuant to
I.C. § 20-621, an inmate "shall" merely be "allowed" an early release under
certain

conditions,

including,

implicitly,

judicial

review

of

the

sheriff's

recommendation. See also Dictionary.com (Accessed June 12, 2014) (defining
"allowed" as "to give permission to or for; permit").
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Policy considerations further support the state's interpretation of the
statute. Under the interpretation set forth by Thiel and the district court, there is
no oversight or review of a sherrif's determination that an inmate has complied
with the requirements of I.C. § 20-621.

In his letter "recommending" Thiel's

release, the Ada County Sheriff quoted relevant language from I.C. § 20-621, but
provided no actual documentation or support for his conclsuory statement that
Thiel complied with the statute's requirements. Indeed, under the district court's
interpretation of the statute, no support or explanation is required, because no
judicial review is permitted.

Such an interpretation shields an important

consideration - whether to release an individual convicted of a crime from
custody prior to the completion of his lawfully-imposed sentence - from both
judicial review, and from any potential challenge from prosecutors, who would
have no opportunity to contest whether the criteria of I.C. § 20-621 had been met.
The district court's interpretation of the statute also endangers certain
rights held by Idaho crime victims.

Pursuant to I.C. § 19-5306(1)(e), a crime

victim has the right to be heard, upon their request, at all criminal justice
proceedings, specifically including those where a criminal defendant's "release
from custody" is considered.

Such a right would be meaningless if a magistrate

court has no authority other than to follow the mandatory directive of a county
sheriff to release an inmate.
Finally,

as discussed

in

greater detail below,

the district court's

interpretation of I.C. § 20-621 would render it unconstitutional.

Generally

speaking, "it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which
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will not render it a nullity." Hecla Mining Co. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 108
Idaho 147,151,697 P.2d 1161, 1165 (1985). Thus, where a statute is ambiguous,
a court may presume that the legislature did not intend an interpretation of the
statute which would render it unconstitutional.
Idaho Code § 20-621 is ambiguous because it does not describe the
respective roles and duties of the county sheriff and magistrate court in the goodtime early inmate release process.

Application of the tools of statutory

construction, and a consideration of the relevant public policy concerns, reveals
that the legislature did not intend to provide county sheriffs unbridled authority to
direct magistrate courts to release inmates. Therefore, the district court erred in
reversing the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion for release from
custody.

D.

In The Alternative, To The Extent I.C. § 20-621 Provides County Sheriffs
The Authority To Direct Magistrate Courts To Release Inmates, The Statute
Violates The Idaho Constitution
Article II, § 1 of the Idaho Constitution distributes power to the three

distinct departments of government, and provides that "no person or collection of
persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted." Article V, § 13 of
the Idaho Constitution specifically prohibits the legislature from "depriv[ing] the
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it."
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Therefore, the legislature may not divest authority from the magistrate court
unless expressly provided for in the Idaho constitution. 2
Among the inherent powers of the judiciary is the power to control and
prevent abuse of a court order, such as a judgment of conviction and sentencing
determination, Mahaffey v. State, 87 Idaho 227, 232, 392 P.2d 279, 281 (1964),
and the power to exercise discretion in sentencing, State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
240,486 P.2d 247,251 (1971); see also State v. Easley. 156 Idaho 214, 302-303,
322 P.3d 296, _

(2014) (holding that the Idaho Fifth Judicial District's practice

of granting prosecutors an "absolute veto" over the post-judgment court's ability
to sentence a defendant to mental health court violated the Idaho Constitution's
Separation of Powers doctrine). Consistent with this inherent authority, the Idaho
Criminal Rules further provide courts specific authority to reduce sentences in
some circumstances. See I.C.R. 35.
In this case, to the extent I.C. § 20-621 provides county sheriffs the
authority to direct magistrate courts to release inmates, the statute divests
sentencing authority from the judiciary, and effectively gives sheriffs the authority
to modify judgments of conviction.

Because the Idaho Constitution does not

expressly direct or permit this type of divestiture of power, such an interpretation
of I.C. § 20-621 renders it constitutionally invalid.

The district court therefore

erred in reversing the magistrate court's order that denied Thiel's motion for
release from custody.
2 Article

IV, § 7 of the Idaho Constitution grants the Idaho legislature the power to
prescribe procedures governing applications for clemency through a board of
pardons, but provides that "no commutation" of sentences may be granted
except by compliance with the procedures described in that section.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to vacate the district court's
appellate decision, reinstate the magistrate court's order denying Thiel's motion
for release from custody, and to remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2014.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of June, 2014, I caused two true
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Dylan Orton
Ada County Public Defender's Office
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702

MARK W. OLSON'
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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